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Discussant's Response to 
Use of Decision Theory in Auditing— 
A Practitioner's View 
William L. Felix, Jr. 
University of Washington 
Jim Loebbecke is to be complimented on his willingness to provide a prac-
titioner's view of a topic area that is, I am sure, very difficult to deal with. 
Researchers interested in using decision theory as a descriptive model of 
auditing practice need feedback and criticism from practitioners. Otherwise, it is 
very likely that inaccurate models and inferences from these models will result. 
I would particularly like to observe the importance of contributions such as the 
auditor's logic process that Jim provided in his 1974 comment on my paper. 
These views of the basic audit process, including (1) steps for the collection of 
particular kinds of evidence and (2) steps that represent major decision points 
in the audit process, are the kind of basic information and feedback that is 
necessary to construct useful models. 
Significance of Research on Decision Theory 
The significance of the research efforts in decision theory may not be entirely 
clear. The line of argument that is most appealing to me is that a decision theory 
model requires rather precise specification of relationships and decisions that may 
have previously been left rather vague and imprecise. The result of greater 
precision ought to be better understanding of the consistencies and differences 
in the various opinion formulation processes being used in the profession. In 
addition, the resulting well structured and understood models would improve 
the ability of researchers to investigate problems and by implication, for the 
profession to adapt to changes. 
Possible Misconceptions 
On the first page of his paper, Jim indicates that approximately 30% of the 
practitioners he surveyed have some idea as to what decision theory implies with 
regard to auditing. Being realistic, I suspect that this is a fairly optimistic figure. 
There are probably only a handful of practitioners in this country that can 
approach Jim's knowledge of this particular application of statistical inference. 
Yet I think that his paper indicates that he has some misconceptions about the 
nature of decision theory, either as a normative model of the auditor's decision 
processes or as a descriptive model of how auditors behave. Let me illustrate my 
point with a couple of observations from Jim's paper. In the last paragraph on 
page 110 of his paper under "point 1" he states that the decision to extend work is 
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biased towards a one-sided expected cost. That is, that the auditor is so over-
whelmed by the potential impact of Jim's Type I error that other potential deci-
sion factors don't matter. I would agree that this outcome is possible, but it seems 
to me that regardless of whether or not this situation will exist, a decision theory 
model will handle it properly. The auditor's degree of belief or probability for 
this type of error is used to weight the cost of the error so that the result or 
expected value is used in making choices. Regardless of how overwhelming the 
consequences of such an error, if it is of very low probability or very unlikely to 
occur, it may not be significant in the final outcome. Some of Jim's discussion 
indicates that he understands this point yet he is describing it here as a difference 
in the model. 
Risk Assessment 
On page 111, Jim's discussion indicates some concern about the objectiveness 
of the assessment of the risks the auditor uses in decision making. It is my 
belief that the critical assessments of risk made by the auditor are now, and 
always will be subjective. Decision theory, or its use in auditing, does not imply 
an objective measurement of risk. A l l that is required is that in some way the 
auditor elicit subjective assessments of risk and combine them with whatever 
objective sampling evidence is available to reach a composite risk assessment 
that is then used for decision making. This point is raised again on page 115, 
where Jim states that it would appear that ". . . the aspect (of auditing) which 
most closely relates to the formal decision theory model is the determination of 
the extent of procedures—that is, sample size." It may be that most near-term 
applications of a decision theory model would be in audit decisions that relate 
to samples and sample sizes, but the use of the model itself is primarily oriented 
toward the combination of the results of judgment and sampling in order to 
reach audit decisions both in terms of individual tests and as the auditor aggre-
gates evidence from a variety of sources to reach overall decisions on balances 
and the financial statements taken as a whole. 
Audit Process Model 
To illustrate, let me refer to the flow chart in Appendix I. As complex as 
this chart appears, it is only a partial model of the audit process. It presents 
the elicitation, assessment, and evidence composition problem for accounting 
systems, the conversion or transition from accounting system error rates to 
account balance error rates, the assessment of balance error amounts and their 
composition for total error amounts, and the individual account error amount 
aggregation problem, all in one chart. Clearly missing are the beginnings of 
the process where the auditor engages in a general learning process before 
trying to disaggregate this general evidence to priors on the error rate for 
specific procedures, the contribution of this general learning to assessments for 
decision problems throughout the audit process, and most critically, the 
specification of the terminal loss function which will be used for decisions 
throughout the process. The major point that I would like to make from the 
chart is that it indicates that a decision theory model is certainly not oriented pri-
marily toward determination of the extent of audit procedures. It is far broader. 
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On page 110, Jim observes that the two-state decision model in my prior 
paper does not represent all the alternatives. I would certainly agree that the 
model was designed primarily to illustrate the potential rather than to be a 
definitive description. In another paper, a student and I have addressed the 
problem of expressing the auditor's payoff function more realistically. Appendix 
II illustrates a possible specification of the auditor's action space. Note that 
the action space includes a clean opinion, various kinds of non-standard opinions, 
and withdrawal from the engagement. 
Appendix III illustrates the nature of the loss functions that we are exploring. 
These models allow inclusion of both fixed and variable losses. Each functional 
form is made up of, at most, three plateaus, corresponding to immaterial near 
zero error amounts, small error amounts, and extremely large error amounts. 
The change from one plateau to the next starts out slowly, builds up rapidly, 
and then slowly approaches the target plateau. Also, rather than argue for a 
single payoff function, we suggest a decomposition of the assessment problem 
into three components: professional reputation, legal costs, and settlement costs. 
In conclusion, I would like to return to the title of Jim's paper. We are not 
ready for the use of decision theory in auditing, and many of Jim's comments 
are indicative of the reasons why such use is not now being proposed. Continued 
research and teaching of decision theory in auditing are both desirable, how-
ever, because of the potential of this methodology to make us better heuristic 
decision makers, and the promise of the research to achieve those benefits in 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX I I 
Specification of Auditor's Action Space 
Clean opinion 
Non-Standard (Extended below) 
Withdrawal 







dispute on GAAP 
An inconsistency in 
principle or entity 
Level of Materiality 
Moderate 
"Except for" opinion 
qualification 
"Subject to" opinion 
qualification 
"Except for" opinion 
qualification 







APPENDIX II I 
Three Plateau Loss Functions 
L ( x ) = The present value of a f t e r tax losses corresponding to e r r o r 
amount x. 
X = The aggregate error amount. 
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